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Almost twenty years ago, as I was a doctoral student in Stras-
bourg, France, I had the privilege to follow a course by Professor 
Shael Herman, who taught an Introduction to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (UCC). In passing, he could not resist to evoke his beloved 
“footnote.” What he called the “footnote” was Louisiana law: he ex-
plained that in American law books one often finds footnotes like 
“except in Louisiana;” “as for Louisiana, see …,” and so on.1 He 
painted us a vivid portrait of the Romanesque genesis of Louisiana 
civil law; he celebrated its Frenchness and its hybridity, in a word: 
its fascinating singularity; he made us love the intellectual jewel that 
it is. Since that time, my passion for Louisiana law has never de-
creased. I am more than delighted to explore today another one of 
its facets. 
                                                                                                             
 ∗     Associate Professor, Institut François Gény, University of Lorraine, 
France. 
 1. Comp. Shael Herman, Apologia for a Footnote, 7 TUL. CIV. L.F. 187 
(1992) 187. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THREE GOALS 
In the course of this lecture, I will address a herculean task un-
dertaken by Prof. Moréteau and the Center of Civil Law Studies of 
LSU: “The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project.” They have 
translated the present version of the Louisiana Civil Code (La. C.C.) 
in French, so that now the Louisiana Civil Code exists again in its 
original language. A Spanish translation is also envisaged. This bi-
lingual, and in the future trilingual, “footnote” is accessible online, 
a ubiquity that assures a maximal diffusion.2  
One may wonder about the purpose of such an undertaking. Syl-
vie Monjean-Decaudin has already highlighted the different pur-
poses of code translation in general.3 To understand the motives of 
the translation of the La. C.C. in particular, let’s take a look at the 
project description, “The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: 
An Introduction.”4 It reveals that the aim of this translation is three-
fold.  
Firstly, “the translation project will make the Civil Code availa-
ble to Francophone Louisianans” and, consequently, contribute to 
the promotion of the linguistic rights of this minority, disdained by 
a legislature that “may have forgotten that civil codes are drafted for 
citizens ….”5  
Secondly, the Louisiana Civil Code is viewed as an alternative 
model that may facilitate law reform in mixed jurisdictions that have 
a civil code inspired from the Napoleonic Code.  
                                                                                                             
 2. https://www.law.lsu.edu/clo/louisiana-civil-code-online/. 
 3. See Sylvie Monjean-Decaudin, Pourquoi traduire un code, hier, et 
aujourd’hui ?, in this same volume of the J. CIV. L. STUD.; See also Olivier 
Cachard, Translating the French Civil Code: Politics, Linguistics and Legislation, 
21 CONN. J. INT’L. L. 41 (2005). 
 4. Olivier Moréteau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An In-
troduction 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 97 (2012); See also Olivier Moréteau, Le Code civil 
de Louisiane en Français : traduction et retraduction, 28 INT J. SEMIOT. LAW 155 
(2015). 
 5. Id. at 98. 
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Thirdly, it is suggested that the Civil Code of Louisiana could 
serve as a model for civil law countries as well: “Overall, the trans-
lated civil code should serve as a guide for law reform, in civil law 
countries trying to bridge the divide with common law systems. This 
is the case of most Member States of the European Union ….”6 
We would have expected a fourth goal: The Louisiana Civil 
Code as chevalier blanc entering the European Civil Code tourna-
ment.7 But Prof. Olivier Moréteau thinks that Europeans do not need 
a European Civil Code. He is a partisan of pluralism and diversity.8 
I think the Louisiana Civil Code could have an influence on Eu-
ropean law, depending on the point of view we adopt. If we limit 
ourselves to the traditional national codification, as a model, the 
Louisiana Civil Code has a very limited chance of success. But, if 
we adopt a broader view and consider the law as a global market and 
the Louisiana Civil Code as a highly marketable product, we have 
good reasons to be optimistic.  
II. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE AS THE EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE? 
In Louisiana, you are probably not aware of what a British 
scholar teaching in France labeled a “game of cat and mouse.”9 A 
rather vicious game, where the leading member states attempt—
with a variable skillfulness—to place their own codification on the 
                                                                                                             
 6. Id. 
 7. In European parlance, the future (?) European Civil Code bears the less 
elegant name of “Common Frame of Reference:” Martinj W. Hesselink, The Com-
mon Frame of Reference As a Source of European Private Law, 83 TUL. L. REV. 
919 (2009); THE POLITICS OF THE COMMON FRAME OF REFERENCE (Alessandro 
Somma ed. 2009); now, the EU has lowered its ambitions and concentrates on a 
unified sales law, the so called “Common European Sales Law” (‘CESL’): 
EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES ON EUROPEAN SALES LAW (Javier Plaza Penadés & Luz 
M. Martínez Velencoso eds. 2015). 
 8. Olivier Moréteau, A Summary Reflection on the Future of Civil Codes in 
Europe in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR HELMUT KOZIOL 1449, 1451 (Peter Apathy, 
Raimund Bollenberger et al. eds., Sramek, Vienna 2010). 
 9. Ruth Sefton-Green, The DFCR, the Avant-Projet Catala and French Le-
gal Scholars: A Story of Cat and Mouse?, 12 EDIN. L.R. 351 (2008). 
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European exchequer. Not only is there a competition between dif-
ferent national projects and academic circles, but in France there is 
also a competition between different projects and persons. The latest 
French project is only a few months old, but for the first time it 
seems to have a chance to be realized.10 All of its predecessors are 
now sleeping Beauties waiting for a Prince charming who will never 
come. If we focus on the French attitude towards a European codi-
fication, it is very simple to sum up. In the words of Ralf Michaels: 
“Where a European Code threatens to replace the code civil with 
something different, it must be opposed. Where, by contrast, the 
code civil is allowed to become a European Code …, Europeaniza-
tion is supported.”11 
The same could be said about almost each European country. 
Probably because the majority of scholars, to which I belong, is not 
convinced by such an endeavor. First, and very simply, I am not sure 
that we really need such a code. The American example amply 
demonstrates that the multiplicity of laws is not an impediment to a 
dynamic interior market. Why not continue to brew European law 
in microbreweries? What Shael Herman writes for American law is 
transposable to the European situation:  
Like microbreweries producing their distinctive ales and 
beers, the various state judiciaries … construe enactments of 
their coordinate legislatures and produce case law …. But by 
                                                                                                             
 10. PROJET DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DES CONTRATS, DU RÉGIME GÉNÉRAL ET 
DE LA PREUVE DES OBLIGATIONS, RENDU PUBLIC LE 25 FÉVRIER 2015, with a com-
mentary from Nicolas Dissaux & Christophe Jamin (Dalloz 2015); Cécile Chabas, 
Commentaire de l’avant-projet de réforme du régime général des obligations, 113 
REVUE LAMY DROIT CIVIL 105 (2014). In the meanwhile, the much awaited new 
law of obligations saw the light : Ordonnance 2016-131 du 10 février 2016 portant 
réforme du droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations 
[Ordonnance 2016-131 of February 10, 2016 on the Reform of Contract Law, of 
Obligations in general and of Proof of Obligations] Journal officiel de la Répu-
blique française [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Feb. 11, 2016; see M. 
Mekki, The General Principles of Contract Law in the “Ordonnance” on the Re-
form of Contract Law, 76 LA. L. REV. 1193 (2016). 
 11. Ralf Michaels, Code vs. Code: Nationalist and Internationalist Images of 
the Code civil in the French Resistance to a European Codification, 8 EUROPEAN 
REVIEW OF CONTRACT LAW 277 (2012). 
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definition, these different case-products are at best only per-
suasive for neighboring states who chauvinistically vouch 
for their own domestic products. As in beer so in commercial 
law. Strength resides in diversity. E pluribus unum.12 
Secondly, I really wonder why we should “bridge the divide” 
between common law and civil law in Europe. I cannot agree more 
with Mauro Bussani:  
Why should any European codification effort pay a time- 
and energy-consuming tribute to the search for a compro-
mise between continental and common law solutions? Why 
should this effort be carried on with a counterparty—the 
United Kingdom—that … has always kept it self as a dis-
tance from the most significant milestones of the European 
Union institutional story …? Why should the continental tra-
dition not rely merely and deliberately on itself to strengthen 
its own capacity for dialogue with the non-European world 
living on a civilian legacy in the Americas, in Africa and in 
Asia?13  
Thirdly, a Code of obligations, or, a fortiori, a European civil 
code, doesn’t seem to still be the right way to legislate. Why? Be-
cause the post-modern man (or woman) aspires to justified law; he 
or she is reluctant towards the apodictic nature of codes, or, more 
generally, of statutory law. In our post-modern, multicultural and 
                                                                                                             
 12. S. Herman, Competition in the Land of Microbreweries: Managing Mul-
tistate Transactions in the United States, 5 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 351, 355 
(1997); see, in the same vein, Alain A. Levasseur, “Réponse Louisianaise” in 
Réponse de la Fondation pour le droit continental, REVUE DES CONTRATS 1376 
(2011): “Les deux cents ans de coexistence du Code civil louisianais, en langue 
anglaise, avec la common law de quarante-neuf États sur un même continent ne 
semblent pas conduire à la conclusion que l’unification du ‘droit privé’ soit une 
nécessité sur ce continent.” 
 13. Mauro Bussani, A Streetcar Named Desire: The European Civil Code in 
the Global Legal Order, 83 TUL. L. REV. 1083, 1091 (2009). Levasseur supra 
note 12, expresses the same opinion in a more vigorous way:  
Si je transpose le rapport ‘Louisiane contre 49 États de common law’ 
dans le cadre de l’Union européenne, il devient alors ‘Grande-Bretagne-
Irlande contre 23 (?), 24 (?), 25 (?) États continentaux civilistes’. Il me 
semble que ce rapport parle de lui-même ! Des ‘compromis’ avec la 
Grande-Bretagne devraient-ils conduire à une ‘harmonisation’ du droit 
du contrat (et non des contrats) de la civil law vers la common law ? À 
une harmonisation du droit de la vente de la civil law vers la common 
law ? Impensable ! 
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pluralistic society, women and men desire to choose the law that will 
govern them.14 The liberty of choice is already big on the law market 
of the 21st century; it could be bigger in a libertarian society. Let’s 
begin with a utopia and let’s end with the reality, which is not that 
far from utopia. 
III. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE IN THE LAW MARKET: UTOPIA AND 
REALITY 
A. The Libertarian Utopia 
I am not sure that everyone here is familiar to the libertarian 
school of thought. As a matter of introduction, I will quote David 
Friedman’s “The machinery of Freedom” (1973), one of the canon-
ical books of anarcho-capitalism:  
The central idea of libertarianism is that people should be 
permitted to run their own lives as they wish. We totally re-
ject the idea that people must be forcibly protected from 
themselves .… We also reject the idea that people have an 
enforceable claims on others, for anything else than being 
left alone.15  
In a chapter dedicated to police, courts and laws, Friedman elab-
orates further on the dispensability of the state.16 Police, courts and 
laws? On the market! As a way to solve the private law disputes, the 
path to a libertarian society would be the unlimited potential to re-
sort to mediation and arbitration.17 But you may ask, in such an an-
archist society, who would make the laws? “The answer is that sys-
tems of law would be produced for profit on the open market just as 
books and bras are produced today.”18 There would be many private 
                                                                                                             
 14. JAN M. SMITS, PRIVATE LAW 2.0—ON THE ROLE OF PRIVATE ACTORS IN 
A POST-NATIONAL SOCIETY (Eleven Int’l Publishing 2011). 
 15. DAVID FRIEDMAN, THE MACHINERY OF FREEDOM—GUIDE TO A 
RADICAL CAPITALISM xiii (3rd ed. 2014) at XIII. 
 16. In fact, according to the libertarian thought, the State is not only dispen-
sable, it is nefarious. A parasite. See MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, ANATOMY OF THE 
SATE (2009). 
 17. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 110. 
 18. Id. at 112. 
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courts and a variety of legal systems. Each court would choose the 
most efficient law to settle disputes. Would that society be messy? I 
don’t think so: even today, there is a lot of uncertainty; the law that 
applies to you sometimes depends on the country you live in; and 
sometimes, it depends on your nationality. Sometimes, it is purely 
accidental; remember the infamous lex loci delicti.19 Of course, 
those who join the myth according to which uniformity is beautiful 
will object that Friedman’s model is a dystopic regression. But, if 
the plurality of legal systems cohabiting in a territory is really prob-
lematic, “courts will have an economic incentive to adopt uniform 
law, just as papers companies have an incentive to produce stand-
ardized size of paper.”20 Basically, there would be a “competition 
among different brands of law, just as there is competition among 
different brands of cars.”21  
What will these “brands” of law be? As it is rather intellectually 
challenging to create a brand new legal framework ex nihilo, arbi-
tration agencies will be in search of existing adaptable models. 
Whether such rules are efficient, they are familiar to the parties and 
they provide answers to most of the relevant questions. They there-
fore provide a potential point of initial agreement and can conduct 
further bargaining. The La. C.C. could be this point of initial agree-
ment for any libertarian society which could get convinced by the 
charms of Louisiana civil law. I’ll try to explain later why they 
should. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 19. The rejection of the lex loci delicti commissi was one of the motives of 
the “American Choice-of-law Revolution.” See Symeon. C. Symeonides, The 
American Choice-of-Law Revolution in the Courts: Today and Tomorrow 298 
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE DE LA HAYE 448 
(Brill 2002). 
 20. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 116. 
 21. Id. at 112. 
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B. The Law Market Hic et Nunc 
This utopia may remain nothing else than a utopia. Nevertheless, 
the “law market” is already there.22 By “law market,” I refer: 
to ways that governing laws can be chosen by people and 
firms rather than mandated by states. This choice is created 
by the mobility of at least some people, firms and assets and 
the incentives of at least some states to compete for people, 
firms and their assets by creating desired laws.23  
One of the main sources of this law market is the possibility that 
people have to choose the law of another state. The party autonomy 
principle is cardinal in European private international law.24 Let’s 
remind us article 3 [Freedom of choice] of the ‘Rome I Regulation’: 
“A contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties ….” 
Indeed, it’s almost a universal principle.25 Thus, the Louisiana rules 
regarding the law of obligations could be chosen by parties world-
wide to govern a contract. Indeed, it is generally admitted that con-
tract partners can even choose a “neutral law,” a law that has no 
particular factual, geographical or legal relationship with the con-
tract. In the same vein, international arbitration law offers a great 
freedom for parties to choose the applicable law.26 Again, the parties 
are free to choose the law they wish, and again, they could choose 
Louisiana law of obligations. Yet, even though this principle exists 
                                                                                                             
 22. ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2009). 
 23. Id. Chapter 4, in limine. 
 24. For a critical approach, see Horatia Muir Watt, “Party autonomy” in in-
ternational contracts: from the making of a myth to the requirements of global 
governance, 6 ERCL 250 (2010). 
 25. Russell J. Weintraub, Functional Developments in Choice of Law for 
Contracts, 187 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONALE 
DE LA HAYE 271 (Brill 1984). 
 26. Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its 
Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 358 (1981); Rachel Engle, Party Au-
tonomy in International Arbitration: Where Uniformity Gives Way to Predictabil-
ity, 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 323 (2002); Charles Chatterjee, The Reality of the Party 
Autonomy Rule in International Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 539 (2003). 
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in international law, libertarian doctrine would suggest an extension 
of this rule to national legal relations. 
At this stage, we can see that there is a great possible field for 
the success of the Louisiana Civil Code. But, what about the prac-
tice? 
Why should Europe adopt such a model if a European civil code 
was to see the light? And why would contract partners choose Lou-
isiana law if they have no special ties with civil law or a mixed ju-
risdiction?  
Now, I will inquire if the La. C.C. is worth being adopted, be it 
by a legislature or by parties of a contract. 
IV. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE IS AN ATTRACTIVE GOOD ON THE 
LAW MARKET 
I believe that, in the competition between legal systems, the Lou-
isiana Civil Code has an eminent role to play. Needless to say, some 
institutions of the Louisiana civil law are too culturally impregnated 
to be easily exported: family law, matrimonial regimes or succession 
law, for example. The two books that appear as very marketable are 
Book III and Book IV. Book III is entitled “On the different modes 
of acquiring the ownership of things.” At its heart lies the law of 
obligations. Book IV deals with “Conflict of laws.” These sets of 
rules are very attractive for at least three reasons.  
First of all, both France and the E.U. are seeking for reforms and 
harmonization of their conflict of laws. Second, the law of obliga-
tions and the conflict of laws rules are relatively culturally neutral: 
they are largely based on Roman law, logical and guided by the re-
spect of the legitimate expectations of the parties and on economic 
rationality.27 They could then be useful for any arbitration agencies 
                                                                                                             
 27. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS—ROMAN 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION Preface (Clarendon Press 1996); P.E. 
Nygh, The Reasonable Expectations of the Parties as a Guide to the Choice of 
Law in Contract and in Tort, 251 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADÉMIE DE DROIT 
INTERNATIONALE DE LA HAYE 279 (Brill 1995). 
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or legislature. And thirdly, the books on obligations and on conflicts 
of laws enclose many interesting innovations and original provi-
sions, as I will try to illustrate at the end of this speech. 
A. Economically Efficient? 
In a society where law is a product and where people are free to 
choose their law, the good product should be an economically effi-
cient one. This leads us to the haunting question of the efficacy of 
the civil law vis-à-vis the common law. In this field, the perspective 
is shadowy: legal economists contend that legal institutions stem-
ming from the English common law offer superior institutions for 
economic development, as compared to those of the French civil 
law.28 These authors give two main arguments. First, the common 
law system supplies more adequate rules for business transactions 
and financial markets; second, French private law assumes a too im-
portant place for state interventionism, which inhibits its economic 
effectiveness. But, what to think about mixed jurisdictions, and, es-
pecially, about Louisiana law? If common law is really beneficial to 
economic growth, the endurance of hybrid legal systems where pri-
vate law belongs to the civil law tradition is perplexing. As we well 
know, common law neighbors exert a great pressure on the “foot-
note” (Louisiana law) to put it back in the main text (U.S. common 
law). Hence, there may be a good reason—and not solely a fierce 
chauvinism—why this footnote does not surrender, despite the dis-
comfort of the bottom of the text. The vitality of the Louisiana Civil 
Code did not happen by chance. Darwinism, or at least common 
sense, teaches us that generally useless organisms tend to disap-
pear.29 
                                                                                                             
 28. For a critical account of these common places about the non-efficiency of 
the civil law, see: Nuno M. Garoupa & Andrew P. Morriss, The Fable of the 
Codes: the Efficiency of the Common Law, Legal Origins, and Codification Move-
ments, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV., 1443 (2012). 
 29. Nuno M. Garoupa & Carlos Gomez Ligüerre, The Efficiency of the Com-
mon Law: The Puzzle of Mixed legal families, 29 WIS. INT’L L.J. 671 (2012). 
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But let’s not take law and economics too seriously; at least be-
cause an important finding of law and economics research in the two 
last decades has been that the rationality assumption of the homo 
economicus is often overestimated, if not mistaken. In effect, eco-
nomic agents are plagued with diverse cognitive limitations that 
bound their rationality. As an illustration, a recent empirical study 
showed that the reason why parties in international contract disputes 
preferred English law and Swiss law was far from crystal clear, and 
that the attractiveness of two very different contract laws in essence 
could be explained by a combination of extrinsic factors and intrin-
sic qualities of those contract laws.30 The extrinsic factors are as 
various as the seats of the arbitration, the language in which the laws 
are available, the so-called “neutrality” of the chosen law, the model 
contracts, the influence of the global law firms and the colonial past. 
I will comment on two of them, the language and the neutrality. 
Firstly: the language. Francophiles and francophones will see a 
provocation in my statement, but the main quality of the La. C.C. is 
that it is American and written in English. The American civilization 
has acquired a de facto leadership: English is a lingua economica 
and a lingua academica, if not the lingua franca of Europe and the 
world.31 Most recently, several countries of continental Europe have 
admitted, or are discussing to admit, English as an optional court 
language.32 Surprisingly enough, France belongs to these pioneer 
countries. Moreover, U.S. law(s) and U.S. law schools are prestig-
ious; everywhere, we can observe a true reception of American 
                                                                                                             
 30. G. Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most Attrac-
tive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 455 (2014). 
 31. Robert Phillipson, Lingua franca or lingua frankensteinia? English in Eu-
ropean Integration and Globalization, 27 WORLD ENGLISHES 250 (2008). 
 32. Christoph A. Kern, English as a Court Language in Continental Courts, 
5 ERASMUS L. REV. 187 (2012). 
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law,33 even if its exact extent is subject to debate.34 Willy-nilly, 
American English is the vernacular language of the 21st century, es-
pecially in the world of trade and international contracts,35 even if 
linguists regularly warn us that legal English is not adapted to such 
contracts.36 On the contrary, the Louisiana Civil Code offers civilian 
legal English, which is suited for international contracts between 
parties who do not belong to the common law world. It could also 
provide a common language for civilians in Europe.37 But, if Eng-
lish dominates the international commerce, it doesn’t have a monop-
oly. French is spoken in many of its former colonies and remains the 
second language in international diplomacy. As for Spanish, it is 
spoken not only in Latin America, but also in the United states. 
Thus, our trilingual footnote will be accessible in languages that are 
known at least passively by the immense majority of the merchants 
and lawyers of the world. It is a great strength. 
Second, the Louisiana Civil Code has the quality of neutrality. I 
mean that it possesses this dose of universalism that is necessary to 
be adapted in different places and cultures. Jurists accustomed to the 
French legal culture feel at home when they delve into the Louisiana 
civil code, even if its language is English. But this impression of 
déjà vu is starkly nuanced by the presence of truly distinctive pieces 
that awaken deep interest; all the reforms of the past decades have 
borrowed from a variety of legal traditions: German law, Dutch law, 
                                                                                                             
 33. Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 229 (1991). 
 34. Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Conver-
gence? in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M. Fried-
man & Harry N. Scheiber eds., Westview Press 1996); see the volume L’améri-
canisation du droit, 45 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT (2001). 
 35. Nedim Peter Vogt, Anglo-Internationalisation of Law and Language: 
English as the Language of Law, 29 INT'L LEGAL PRAC. 112 (2004).  
 36. Barbara J. Beveridge, Legal English—How it Developed and Why It is 
Not Appropriate for International Commercial Contracts in THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF LEGAL LANGUAGE 55, 63 (Heikki E. S. Mattila ed., Helsinki: Kauppakaari 
2002). Also available online at http://www.tradulex.com/articles/Beveridge.pdf. 
 37. See Olivier Moréteau, Can English Become the Common Legal Language 
in Europe? in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW 405 (R. Schulze 
& G. Ajani eds., 2003). 
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common law, etc. The result, which some of you may regret, is that 
the Louisiana civil code is less French; but this loss is compensated 
by a huge gain: it has evolved into an authentically European code. 
As the only genuine European Civil Code, the Louisiana Civil Code 
is very suitable for cross-cultural relations. This is why European 
jurists should absolutely draw from the experiment from their Lou-
isiana colleagues to build a truly European Code, if they really want 
to get one.38 This is also the reason why partners of a contract could 
choose Louisiana law as a “neutral” lex contractus. 
Because of my lack of time, I will only give two examples, one 
concerning the law of obligations, the other concerning conflict of 
laws.  
B. Two Examples of Marketable Provisions 
Let’s begin with article 1967, which introduced the concept of 
promissory estoppel in Louisiana law,39 without revolutionizing it.40 
                                                                                                             
 38. Mathias Reimann, Towards A European Civil Code: Why Continental Ju-
rists Should Consult Their Transatlantic Colleagues, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1337, 1341 
s. (1999). 
 39. In the case of Ducote v. Oden (221 La. 228, 59 So.2d 130 [1952]), the 
Louisiana Supreme Court held that promissory estoppel was unknown to Louisi-
ana law. This remained jurisprudence constante until the enactment of art. 1967. 
It seems that there was no need for Louisiana courts to resort to the doctrine of 
promissory estoppel. General provisions of the Civil Code relating to contract, 
quasi-delict and delict provided solutions to the questions that were solved with 
promissory estoppel in common law jurisdictions: Federick H. Sutherland, Prom-
issory Estoppel and Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REV. 84 (1970). For the theoretical foun-
dations and the genesis of the new provision, see Shael Herman, Detrimental Re-
liance in Louisiana Law—Past, Present, and Future: The Code Drafter's Perspec-
tive, 58 TUL. L. REV. 707 (1984); Mohamed Y. Mattar, Promissory Estoppel: 
Common Law Wine in Civil Law Bottles, 4 TUL. CIV. L.F. 71 (1988); See also Jon 
C. Adock, Detrimental Reliance, 45 LA. L. REV. 753, 762 (1985) (discussing the 
nature of “detrimental reliance,” and how it does not harmonize well with the 
civilian theory of contracts); David D. Snyder, Comparative Law in Action: Prom-
issory Estoppel, The Civil Law and The Mixed Jurisdiction in LOUISIANA: 
MICROCOSM OF A MIXED JURISDICTION, 235, 273 et seq. (Vernon Valentine 
Palmer ed., 1999) (analyzing the cases rendered before and after the enactment of 
art. 1967 and showing that the majority of the courts adheres to the contractual 
theory). 
 40.  In Louisiana, the doctrine of “detrimental reliance” under Civil Code ar-
ticle 1967 raises some concerns, at least in the field of extinctive prescription. 
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This article finds itself in a chapter entitled “Cause,” in Title IV 
“Conventional Obligations or Contracts,” of Book Three “Modes of 
                                                                                                             
While it is reasonable to consider detrimental reliance as a “personal action” sub-
ject to a ten-year prescriptive period, it is also reasonable to consider it a delictual 
obligation subject to a one-year prescriptive period. See Simmons v. Sowela Tech-
nical Institute, 470 So. 2d 913, 923–24 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) (regarding detri-
mental reliance as both delictual and contractual in nature). Given the nature of 
the cause of detrimental reliance, some Louisiana courts have suggested that such 
a cause of action is imprescriptible. See generally Babkow v. Morris Bart, P.L.C., 
726 So. 2d 423, 429 (La. App. 4 Cir. 1998) (citing Fontenot v. Houston General 
Insurance Co., 467 So. 2d 77 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1985) wherein the court regarded 
statements that lull the plaintiff into a “false sense of security” estopped the de-
fendant from pleading prescription). David v. Snyder, Hunting Promissory Estop-
pel in MIXED JURISDICTIONS COMPARED: PRIVATE LAW IN LOUISIANA AND 
SCOTLAND 316–17 (Vernon V. Palmer & Elspeth Reid eds., 2009) (sustaining 
that, despite the location of art. 1967, Louisiana promissory estoppel has solid 
delictual roots). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a dualist approach:  
Turning to the merits of this issue, the answer to this question turns on 
whether these two claims are viewed as contractual in nature-and thus 
governed by the ten-year period-or delictual in nature-and thus governed 
by the one-year period The question seems simple, but the answer is 
more complex. We have applied both statutes to claims denominated as 
“detrimental reliance” because the nature of the action, rather than its 
label, governs which statute applies. Compare Copeland v. Wasserstein, 
Perella & Co., 278 F.3d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying one-year 
statute), with Stokes v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 894 F.2d 764, 770 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (applying ten-year statute). In other words, “[w]hen evaluat-
ing which prescriptive period is applicable to a cause of action, courts 
first look to the character of the action disclosed in the pleadings.” SS v. 
State, 831 So.2d 926, 931 (La. 2002). We conclude that Keenan’s detri-
mental reliance and promissory estoppel claims derive from a breach of 
promise, like Stokes, rather than a breach of duty, like Copeland (foot-
notes omitted): Keenan v. Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 575 F.3d 
483, 487–8 (5th Cir. 2009).  
This approach has been confirmed in a recent case:  
Detrimental reliance claims based in contract are subject to a ten-year 
prescriptive period. First La. Bank v. Morris & Dickson, Co., LLC, 
45,668 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/3/10), 55 So.3d 815. Furthermore, a promisor 
who lulls the promisee into a false sense of security that an action will 
be taken cannot avail itself of claim of prescription. Babkow v. Morris 
Bart, P.L.C., 98–256 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d 423; Fon-
tenot v. Houston Gen. Ins. Co., 467 So.2d 77 (La. App. 3 Cir.1985). Alt-
hough we find the ten-year prescriptive period applicable to MCGC's 
claims, these circumstances are ones in which estoppel would lie as 
DHH's repeated promises to MCGC that it would investigate and enforce 
its code induced Cormier into abandoning his original lawsuit. DHH's 
multiple failures to do as it promised over many years would justify it 
being estopped from claiming that MCGC's action is prescribed (foot-
note omitted): Murphy Cormier General Contractor, Inc. v. State, Dept. 
of Health & Hospitals,114 So.3d 567, 598–99 (La. App. 3 Cir., 2013). 
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Acquiring Ownership of things.” This chapter starts with article 
1966: “An obligation cannot exist without a lawful cause,” a provi-
sion that is in the straight line of the French civil tradition. The fol-
lowing article gives a simple definition of the cause: “Cause is the 
reason why a party obligates himself.”41 Until now, there is nothing 
new under the sun. But let’s look at the lengthy second paragraph of 
this article: “A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew 
or should have known that the promise would induce the other party 
to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was reasonable in 
so relying.” This article is remarkable: first, it preserves a notion to 
which many of my French colleagues are viscerally attached, quasi 
enamored: la cause. Second, this paragraph codifies a genuinely 
common law concept known as ‘detrimental reliance,’ or ‘equitable 
estoppel.’ The La. C.C. clearly illustrates how the concepts are in-
tellectually linked and bridges the divide between the civil law and 
the common law. But that is not all; the provision provides a very 
flexible solution to sanction the breach of detrimental reliance, add-
ing that: “recovery may be limited to the expenses incurred or the 
damages suffered as a result of the promisee’s reliance on the prom-
ise.” In other words, “a court may grant damages, rather than spe-
cific performance, to the disappointed promise, and may even limit 
damages thus granted to the expenses actually incurred ….”42 
This possible choice between specific performance, a typically 
civilian remedy, and damages, a remedy generally preferred in com-
mon law systems, is another value of this provision. And, as a last 
argument, what a wonderful illustration that “codificatory” doesn’t 
necessarily rhyme with “rigidity:” With this “civilized” form of det-
rimental reliance, the judge has a tool that enables him to take every 
factual and legal element of the case in consideration, and after hav-
ing weighed all the relevant interests, to adopt the fairest solution. 
The introduction of such a provision in the French Code civil would 
                                                                                                             
 41. Art. 1967 La. C. C. 
 42. Comment (e) under art. 1967. 
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put some order in the nascent French case-law on promissory estop-
pel.43 
Now I would like to evoke a topic highly debated in the U.S. and 
in Europe: punitive damages. Louisiana is proudly aligned with 
modern Continental European legal systems in excluding punitive 
damages as incompatible with the purpose of the law of damages: to 
“repair the harm sustained by the victim of a wrong, and not to pun-
ish the wrongdoer.”44 Louisiana lawmakers, courts, and scholars gen-
erally regard the rejection of punitive damages as an important point 
of contact with the modern civil law world, and as a point of departure 
from its common law neighbors. Given that the law of almost every 
                                                                                                             
 43. In France, the last decades have seen the emergence of new sources of 
obligation of a doubtful nature: letters of intent, gentlemen’s agreements, “quasi-
contracts of lottery,” and “unilateral promises” without contract (engagement 
unilatéral de volonté). These sources of obligation have strong connections with 
the concept of detrimental reliance (the long-term distribution relations being one 
of the oldest situations where legitimate expectations are protected without resort-
ing to contract). See FRANÇOIS-XAVIER LICARI, LA PROTECTION DU 
DISTRIBUTEUR INTÉGRÉ EN DROIT FRANÇAIS ET ALLEMAND 513, 517 et seq. 
(2002). The concept of detrimental reliance or promissory estoppel is slowly 
growing in French Law from the fertile soil of the duty of good faith: C. CIV. [Fr.] 
art. 1134 § 3. But see Christian Larroumet, Detrimental Reliance and Promissory 
Estoppel as the Cause of Contracts in Louisiana and Comparative Law, 60 TUL. 
L. REV, 1209, 1224 (1986) (asserting the superfluity of promissory estoppel in a 
civil law system). The terminology itself lacks firmness (principe de cohérence, 
estoppel, interdiction de se contredire au détriment d’autrui, protection de la con-
fiance légitime, etc.). Furthermore, its exact nature and scope need clarification. 
See Horatia Muir Watt, Pour l’accueil de l’estoppel en droit privé français in 
MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE YVON LOUSSOUARN 303 (1994); BERTRAND 
FAGES, LE COMPORTEMENT DU CONTRACTANT n° 630 (P.U.A.M. 1997); Jean Ca-
lais-Auloy, L’attente légitime, une nouvelle source de droit subjectif? in 
MÉLANGES EN L’HONNEUR DE YVES GUYON 171 (2003); Sophie Alexane, Le prin-
cipe de protection de la confiance légitime peut-il se passer d’un préjudice?, 2005 
REVUE DE DROIT DES AFFAIRES DE L’UNIVERSITÉ PANTHÉON-ASSAS 249; Béné-
dicte Fauvarque-Cosson, L’estoppel, concept étrange et pénétrant, REVUE DES 
CONTRATS 1279 (2006); Denis Mazeaud, La confiance légitime et l’estoppel – 
Rapport français in LA CONFIANCE LÉGITIME ET L’ESTOPPEL 247 (B. Fauvarque-
Cosson ed., Société de législation comparées 2007); Pierre-Yves Gauthier, Con-
fiance légitime, obligation de loyauté et devoir de cohérence: identité ou lien de 
filiation? in VALÉRIE-LAURE BÉNABOU & MURIEL CHAGNY, LA CONFIANCE EN 
DROIT PRIVÉ DES CONTRATS 109 (2008). 
 44. Saúl Litvinoff, § 7.6 in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 205 (2d. ed. 
1999); 7 PLANIOL & RIPERT, TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 184 (2d 
ed. 1954); John W. deGravelles & J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive Da-
mages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. (2000). 
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U.S. state as well as a number of U.S. federal laws share a general 
acceptance of punitive damages, one might dismiss the Louisiana 
exception as yet another example of diversity that uniquely charac-
terizes the U.S. legal landscape, and of the delicate balance of Amer-
ican federalism. But for the same reason that globalization has 
forced courts in Continental civil law systems to consider punitive 
damages in the context of conflicts of laws,45 Louisiana courts are 
often required to apply and review foreign laws that are repugnant 
to its ordre public, or public policy. In this sense, the European ex-
perience in a shrinking world, where incompatible legal principles 
cause friction, is something with which the small jurisdiction of 
Louisiana is historically familiar. And how Louisiana resolves the 
conflict of values between the common law world and the civil law 
world is worth meditating. Louisiana Civil Code article 3546 is the 
relevant provision for conflicts of laws in the field of punitive dam-
ages. The creation of Article 3546 was the first known attempt to 
draft a conflicts rule specifically tailored to punitive damages: 
Article 3546: Punitive Damages 
Punitive damages may not be awarded by a court of this state 
unless authorized: 
(1) By the law of the state where the injurious conduct oc-
curred and by either the law of the state where the resulting 
injury occurred or the law of the place where the person 
whose conduct caused the injury was domiciled; or 
(2) By the law of the state in which the injury occurred and 
by the law of the state where the person whose conduct 
caused the injury was domiciled. 
These examples of successful symbiosis or conciliation between 
common law and civil law could be multiplied ad infinitum.46 They 
                                                                                                             
 45. See Patrick J. Borchers, Punitive Damages, Forum Shopping, and the 
Conflict of Laws, 70 LA. L. REV. 529 (2010); Ronald A. Brand, Punitive Damages 
and the Recognition of Judgments, 43 NILR 143 (1996); Benjamin West Janke & 
François-Xavier Licari, Enforcing Punitive Damage Awards in France after 
Fountaine Pajot, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 775 (2012). 
 46. For other examples, see Joachim Zekoll, The Louisiana Private-Law Sys-
tem: The Best of Both Worlds, 10 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 1, 13–27 (1995). 
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are the vibrant illustration of what the Hon. Jean-Louis Beaudouin 
expressed here, at LSU in 2003 during a symposium entitled “Lou-
isiana Bicentenary: A Fusion of Legal Culture 1803–2003:” 
Les pays comme la Louisiane et le Québec qui ont eu l’oc-
casion de vivre les deux traditions et donc d’avoir à leur en-
droit une vision critique, ont eux réussi à assimiler les élé-
ments essentiels de ces deux grandes cultures. C’est pour-
quoi, à mon avis, ils peuvent servir d’exemple et de modèle 
de bijuridisme authentique et concret.47 
Now it’s time to conclude. In 1986, a Louisiana colleague noted: 
“… we would hope that the rest of the Union would stop treating 
Louisiana civil law as the Cinderella of American law and show a 
greater willingness to consider some of the good ideas that emanate 
from our civil code.”48 Today, I have tried to point the serious like-
lihood that our cherished Cinderella may turn into a Princess; our 
host may be the good fairy she was waiting for. 
 
                                                                                                             
 47. Jean-Louis Beaudouin, Systèmes de droit mixte : un modèle pour le 21e 
siècle ?, 63 LA. L. REV. 993, 998 (2003). 
 48. Christopher Osakwe, Introduction—Louisiana Civil Law: The Cinderella 
of American Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (1986). 
